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RECENT DECISIONS
form is not so clear. Two of the three members of the court speaking on this
issue would apparently require that such contracts, to be enforceable, can-
not be expressed in the form of corporate by-laws.
KENNETH R. WILSON
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE DELAYING COMMENCEMENT OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION BY TENANT AGAINST LANDLORD IS QUESTIONED BY COURT-In
1931 property which defendant claimed to own was sold for delinquent
taxes. In 1933 defendant leased the premises to plaintiff, the lease provid-
ing that it should terminate if the lessor were unable to pay the taxes or
should lose possession. The lessor failed to pay the taxes and in 1936 plain-
tiff, who had continued in possession, entered into a contract to purchase
the property from the county, subsequently receiving a deed which in 1941
was held invalid.1 In 1955 plaintiff commenced an action to quiet title to
the property in himself on the basis of adverse possession. The district
court concluded that adverse possession had been established. On appeal to
the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A lease stating that taxes are
then delinquent and providing that if the landlord shall be unable to pay
them the lease shall be automatically terminated constitutes a waiver of
the benefit of the statute which requires that a tenant maintain adverse
possession against his landlord for twice the ordinary period.! Johnstone
v. Sanborn, 358 P.2d 399 (Mont. 1960) (Justice Adair dissenting).
At the time of thisadverse possession Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,
section 93-2512 provided:
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any
persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the
landlord until the expiration of ten years from the termination of
the tenancy, or, where there has been no written lease, until the ex-
piration of ten years from the time of the last payment of rent, not-
withstanding such tenant may have acquired another title, or may
have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But such pre-
sumptions cannot be made after the periods prescribed in this sec-
tion.
The following section required adverse possession for ten years for per-
fecting of title.8 In 1953 both provisions were amended to make the periods
five years. The effect of the two sections is to provide for a doubly long
period of adverse possession where a landlord-tenant relationship has existed
and the tenant has not relinquished possession between his tenancy and
his adverse possession.
Since it held that the lessor had waived the benefit of the statute, the
court was not obliged to apply it, but the majority opinion went out of its
way to state':
'Sanborn v. Lewis and Clark County, 113 Mont. 1, 120 P.2d 567 (1941).2The court also held in the alternative that on the basis of prior proceedings the
title should be quieted In the plaintiff.
'RuvnsmD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2513.
'Instant case at 400.
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There is considerable doubt whether such a statute is valid in view
of the holding in Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 208
P.2d 478. In the Lowery case, this court held that it was not com-
petent for the Legislature to pass a special statute fixing a short
statute of limitations applicable to only certain persons and in-
dividuals, leaving all others in the same circumstances subject to
the general statute of limitations. It would seem that for the same
reasons, the Legislature may not pass a special act fixing a long
statute of limitations, applicable only to certain persons, leaving all
others subject to the general statute of limitations.
The court suggests, therefore, that section 93-2512 may be violative of
the constitutional provision that "where a general law can be made ap-
plicable, no special law shall be enacted.' This provision does not in any
way prevent the enactment of differential legislation based upon reasonable
classifications,' however, and a classification is not open to objection un-
less it precludes the assumption that the classification was made in the
exercise of a real legislative judgment and discretion.' A law is said to be
general and uniform in its operation when it applies equally to all persons
embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided such classifica-
tion is made upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction be-
tween the persons within the class and others not embraced within it. A
law is special and improper if it confers particular privileges or imposes
peculiar disabilities upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a
larger number of persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the
privileges conferred or the disabilities imposed.8
With these principles in mind we should compare the statute involved
in the Lowery case with that cited in the instant case. The statute held
unconstitutional in the Lowery case provided that no action could be main-
tained to assert a title hostile to the grantee of a tax deed unless such action
were brought within eight years,' whereas the general statute of limitations
allowed ten years.' The majority of the court held that the statute was
clearly a special law':
It applies to certain persons and individuals and leaves all others
in the same circumstances subject to the provisions of the general
statute on adverse possession. The right of the legislature to short-
en the Statute of Limitations for the period of adverse possession
is not questioned but it must apply to all classes claiming adversely
and the same requirements during the period of adverse posses-
sion must be required of all persons and classes.
Under the statute, holders of tax deeds were placed in a different class from
all other owners of property. No reasonable basis for the special treatment
of this class was apparent to the court. There was no such difference be-
"Mont. Const. art. V, § 26.
'Tonn v. City of Helena, 42 Mont. 127, 111 Pae. 715 (1910).
'Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, 93 Mont. 291, 19 P.2d 885 (1933).
'Leuthold v. Brandjord, 100 Mont. 96, 47 P.2d 41 (1935).
9Laws of Mont. 1943, ch. 100.
"Note 3, supra.
'Lowery v. Garfield County, 122 Mont. 571, 588, 208 P.2d 478, 487.
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tween tax deed holders and other property owners to justify the shorter
statute of limitations.
In the statute enacting a longer statute of limitations for those who
'have occupied the status of tenant there is much less reason to find the
differential treatment arbitrary. The relation of landlord and tenant is
a distinct, well-recognized one, neither new nor novel.' At common law
a tenant could not set up a title against his landlord at all without first
surrendering possession.' In the absence of a statute, the general rule to-
clay is that the possession of the tenant is not deemed adverse to the land-
lord, so as to enable the tenant to acquire title by adverse possession, unless
there has been a clear repudiation of the holding under the landlord and
notice of such repudiation is brought home to the landlord." The Montana
statute takes an intermediate position, dealing with the problem in the
same way that California and New York have.' It would seem that the
legislature intended to give recognition to the important character of the
relation and to impede the claim of adverse possession by a tenant who has
continued in possession. The relation of landlord and tenant is not a
mere technical one, but implies a relation of trust and confidence which
should not be abused." The relation involves the relinquishment by the
landlord of exclusive possession and control during the term, as distin-
guished from a mere privilege or license."
The dictum in the instant case leaves the standing of the statute gov-
erning adverse possession by a tenant in serious question. The court will
undoubtedly be called upon sometime to answer the question which it has
posed. It is submitted that in view of the foregoing considerations the
court should not conclude that section 93-2512 is unconstitutional. The
classification it makes is based upon a sound traditional distinction.
ROBERT CORONTZOS
DECISION HOLDING CONTRACTION OF POLIO IS INJURY WITHIN MON-
TANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IS OVERTURNED BY LEGISLATUREai-
Decedent was employed as a foreman in the Helena city street department.
He frequently worked and ate at the city shops, in close proximity to city
garb-ge trucaks and the hobo Junoleq For three or four days prior to the
onset of his illness he had been doing fatiguing work in the hot sun. Three
days after he became ill, he died of bulbar polio. The Industrial Accident
Board denied his widow compensation because she failed to show that de-
'Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226 (1941).
"Tewksbury v. Magraff, 33 Cal. 237 (1867).
"51 C.J.S. Lamnlord and Tenant § 282 (1947).
'See CAI. COnE Civ. PRoc. § 326; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 41. Research has failed to
disclose any cases questioning the constitutionality of the statute in these jurisdic-
tions.
"'Ballard v. Gilbert, 55 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1951).
"Kaypar Corp. v. Fosterport Realty Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 469, 69 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1947),
aff'd. 272 App. Div. 878, 72 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1947).
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